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THE DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY TO COMMITTEES
OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS:
DIRECTORS' LIABILITIES
Charles E. M. Kolbt
Recent action by the Securities and Exchange Commission
and the New York Stock Exchange make it clear that the
Commission and the Exchange regard the delegation of
corporate board of directors' authority to independent committees as beneficial to the public interest. In this Article, the
author examines the potential for individual director liability
that arises from such delegation of authority.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Directors' liability for improper delegation of authority is
governed primarily by a state common law and statutory framework
which yields outcomes depending upon the statutory language, the
specific facts pe,rtaining to the corporation, and the director involved.
The traditional "reliance liability" standard permits exculpation of a
. director relying in good faith upon a committee acting under
authority properly delegated. Many states adopt an "ordinarily
prudent person" standard which would vary according to given
director's experience, expertise, and exposure to the corporation's
activities. Directors who serve on committees, therefore, assume
greater liabilities than those who do not.
When committees are required to be established, for example as
part of a Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) consent order
or as part of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) listing
requirements, it is unclear just how much pro forma compliance with
these requirements will absolve the board as a whole from subsequent reliance liability. State common law and statutory provisions
would still appear to be applicable. Nonetheless, the SEC has become
more concerned in recent years that certain committees be both
t A.B., 1973, Princeton University; B.A. Honours, 1975, M.A., 1980, BaIliol

College, Oxford University; J.D., 1978, University of Virginia; Associate,
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Review.
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meaningfully independent and truly effective. A manifestation of
this concern is a trend among recent SEC actions and statements by
commissioners calling for corporations to take their own initiatives
in changing their board structures so as to increase corporate
accountability to their shareholders and the public at large.
Although the SEC professes to favor private initiative instead of
governmental fiat, there are several indications that a federal
standard of fiduciary duty on the part of directors may be emerging.
This article will consider the degree of liability imposed upon
members of a corporation's board of directors for actions taken by a
board committee to which the board has delegated specific authority.
The scope of such accountability is becoming increasingly important
in light of concern by a number of SEC commissioners that
management accountability would be rendered more meaningful to
shareholders and society in general if key committees of the board of
directors serve as independent checks on management activities. To
this end, several SEC commissioners have endorsed the creation of
more independent boards of directors and have urged that directors
on the audit and nominating committees, for example, be wholly
independent of management.!
Both the Watergate affair and the recent international corporate
bribery scandals have accentuated what many observers have
recognized as a "disparity between theory and reality in corporate
governance."2 Referring to a "frustration of our system of corporate
accountability," Professor John C. Coffee, Jr. has noted that the
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce undertook a thorough
rethinking of corporate accountability "in light of the improper
payments controversy."3 One of the Congressional responses to the
fact that over 400 public companies have reported making questionable or illegal foreign payments has been the enactment of the
1. See discussion in text accompanying notes 43-45 infra.
2. Speech by Roberta S. Karmel, former SEC Commissioner, "Politics of Change in
the Composition and Structure of Corporate Boards," at 5, to the American
Society of Corporate Secretaries, Chicago, Illinois (Jan. 11, 1978) [hereinafter
cited as "Chicago I Speech"]. See generally, Moss, The Crisis of Corporate
Accountability: A Legislator's View, 3 J. CORP. L. 251 (1978); Coomse, Directors'
Duties and Responsibilities: New Dimensions, New Opportunities, 95 BANKING L.
J. 634 (1978); Williams, Corporate Accountability and the Lawyer's Role, 34
Bus. LAW. 7 (1978); SEC's Williams, Panelists at West Coast Institute Review
Year's Developments in Corporate Accountability, 487 SEC. REG. L. REP. (BNA)
A-14 (Jan. 24, 1979).
For other commentaries on the issues of corporate governance, see Miller,
SEC to Prepare Wider Disclosure Rules, N.Y. Times, June 8,1978, at D3, col. 1;
Goldstein, Who Governs Corporations?, N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1978, at D4, col. 1;
Miller, At Odds Over Corporate Governance, N.Y. Times, Dec. 24, 1978, at Dl,
col. 3; Hubbard, Company Boards Don't Need Uncle Sam, N.Y. Times, June 24,
1979, ~ III at 14, col. 3.
3. Coffee, Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View of Corporate
Misconduct and an Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REV. 1099, 1102 n.2 &
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Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977. 4 Section 30A of the Act, which
is an amendment to the Securities Exchange Act of 1933,5 prohibits
certain issuers, officers, directors, employees, agents, and stockholders from making questionable payments and imposes a $10,000 fine
or imprisonment of up to five years for willful violation by any
director, officer, or stockholder.
The overall picture which emerges is one demonstrating concern
over corporate accountability in general, and the responsibility of the
board of directors in particular. This article will examine several
responses to the corporate accountability problem as manifested in
the recent debate about the structure of boards of directors. The law
in this area is undeveloped as yet, and the best that one can do in
most instances is to articulate the various positions in the current
discussions. For example, former SEC Commissioner Roberta Karmel has noted that the SEC possesses extensive regulatory powers
under section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19346 "to
maintain, promote and improve fair corporate suffrage for shareholders."7 What is as yet unresolved is whether the SEC will be content
to wait for self-reform in the direction of independent boards, or
whether it will mandate changes in board structure as a matter of
law. At present, the SEC has been preaching voluntary restraint, but
as this article will show, its actions often demonstrate impatience
with this approach. It is interesting to note that according to former
Commissioner Karmel, "Our proxy powers are an intrusion of federal
law into the internal affairs of corporations which could be used to
affect [sic] changes in board structure. For example, in my opinion,
the Commission could mandate the use of nominating committees
under this authority."B
Increasing recognition and emphasis are being accorded to the
view that the corporation is a quasi-public institution which must
serve shareholders and the general public alike. "Corporate existence
is dependent upon the government. Accordingly, in our democratic
society, corporations are expected to function for the public good as
well as for the private benefit of management and shareholders."9
Unresolved at present is whether, given the widespread perception

1129 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Coffeel.
4. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213,91 Stat. 1494 (1977)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78ff (Supp. II 1978».
5. 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1976).
6. 15 U.S.C. § 78(n) (1976).
7. Karmel, Chicago I Speech, supra note 2, at 18.
8. [d. See discussion in text accompanying notes 43-50 infra.
9. Speech by Roberta S. Karmel, former SEC Commissioner, "The Nominating
Committee as a Corporate Accountability Mechanism," at 4, to the Chicago
Association of Commerce and Industry, Chicago, Illinois (Apr. 28, 1978)
[hereinafter cited as "Chicago II Speech"].
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that corporate management and boards of directors have been lax in
th~ir oversight, the problem requires a radical solution such as
federal chartering, or whether corporations can generate the necessary and sufficient reforms internally. A middle position is Professor
Cary's proposal for a Federal Minimum Standards Act specifying
minimum fiduciary standards concerning directors, officers, and
controlling shareholders in order to remove internal interest conflicts
and improper behavior. These standards, however, would not impact
directly on corporate structural reform. 10 For example, Senator
Howard Metzenbaum, Chairman of the Judiciary Subcommittee on
Citizens' and Shareholders' Rights and Remedies, opposes federal
chartering, but has established a committee charged with drafting
legislation that will probably include such proposed federal minimum standards for corporate behavior, setting out uniform responsibilities and liabilities for corporate directors and allowing for
shareholder enforcement. 11
Delegation of authority from board members to various committees is directly implicated in the accountability controversy with
regard to both the nature and extent of such delegation and the
characteristics of those individuals comprising particular committees. The position taken by many, that certain key committees
should consist of independent or non-affiliated (with management)
directors, is intended to strengthen corporate stewardship by providing that major decisions concerning a corporation's future be made
by parties independent of management and its objectives.
II.

DELEGATED CORPORATE AUTHORITY

A. Origins
Initially, at common law, all corporate authority lay with the
board of directors and could not be delegated. As enunciated in Gillis
u. Bailey,12 the board of directors' power was original and could not be
delegated, its powers constituting a grant from the state. Thus, board
members, having been delegated authority themselves from the
state, were unable to delegate this authority any further. The board
lacked common law powers, possessing only those specifically
granted by statute,13 and the board was held to exercise its powers as
a fiduciary on behalf of the stockholders.14 Yet, despite the lack of
explicit statutory authorization, New York courts had upheld the

10. See id at 26.
11. Crock, Manager's Journal- Proxy Disclosures, Wall St. J., Mar. 13, 1978, at 16,
col. 3. See also note 118 infra.
12. 21 N.H. 149 (1850).
13. See Town of Royalton v. Royalton & Woodstock Turnpike Co., 14 Vt. 311 (1842).
14. Cook v. Berlin Woolen Mills Co., 43 Wis. 433, 439 (1877). Note, Delegation of
Duties by Corporate Directors, 7 VA. L. REV. 278 (1961).
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delegation of authority to executive committees of New York
corporations. 15
Once the principle of delegation had been recognized, the issue
then focused on scope. At first, only ministerial duties of the board
could be delegated. 16 Courts, however, gradually began to expand the
delegation concept to so-called discretionary acts as well. 17 More
recently, an "ultimate supervision test" has been applied under
which boards are held directly responsible for matters relating to
high-level control rather than for the direct supervision of every
discretionary act on the corporation's part.1S Today, the scope of
board delegation is still governed by applicable case law, but in most
instances, this delegation is explicitly authorized by a statute which
mayor may not speak in detail as to the scope of delegation and the
extent to which the board members remain responsible, collectively
or individually.19 With delegation established both at common law
and by state statute, the focus necessarily shifted to the relationship
between the board and the executive committee which became the
primary recipient of delegated authority.

B. The Executive Committee
1.

Definition

An executive committee can be defined as "a group of directors
established by the board to exercise its authority in the management
of the corp.orate business."2o Although delegation was permitted,
there were both case law and statutory restrictions on the extent of
this delegation, and it remained clear that directors were not
relieved of their legal responsibilities unless otherwise provided by

15. Ford v. Magee, 160 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1947); Sheridan Elec. Light Co. v.
Chatham Nat'l Bank, 127 N.Y. 517,28 N.E. 467 (1891); Hoyt v. Thompson's
Ex'r, 19 N.Y. 207 (1859).
16. Sherman & Ellis, Inc. v. Indiana Mut. Cas. Co., 41 F.2d 588 (7th Cir. 1930).
17. See Yarnell Warehouse & Transfer, Inc. v. Three Ivory Bros. Moving Co., 226
So. 2d 887 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1969); Olcott v. Tioga R.R. Co., 27 N.Y. 546
(1863) (board can clothe committee with authority to conduct corporation's
ordinary business; however, committee cannot delegate its authority, even to
one of its members). See also In re Lone Star Shipbuilding Co., 6 F.2d 192 (2d
Cir. 1925) (illustrates the lack of clarity between ministerial and discretionary
board duties).
18. See San Antonio Joint Stock Land Bank v. Taylor, 129 Tex. 335, 105 S.W.2d
650 (1937) (dictum), rev'g 101 S.W.2d 868 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936).
19. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (1975 & Supp. 1978); MD. CORP. & ASS'NS CODE
ANN. §§ 2-405, 2-411 (1975 & Supp. 1979); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 712, 717
(McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1979-80).
20. Note, Delegation of Duties by Corporate Directors, 47 VA. L. REV. 278, 281-82
(1961) (citing Steigerwald v. A.M. Steigerwald Co., 9 Ill. App. 2d 31, 132 N.E.2d
373 (1955)); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 3He), 9 V.L.A. 184 (1957); ABA-ALI
MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 38 (1953, rev. 1959).
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statute. 21 Of obvious importance, then, is the extent to which the
executive committee can act on behalf of the full board in committing
the corporation to a given policy or decision. Any answer to this
question necessarily implicates the concern for ministerial and
discretionary duties already discussed. 22
2.

Statutory Scope of Executive Committee Delegation

Today, the executive committee is virtually a "universal phenomenon," with some 97% of large companies having established
them. 23 In every state except one (Arizona), statutes provide the basic
authority for creation of an executive committee, and generally a
corporation's bylaws will either "actually establish the executive
committee and define its duties or permit the board to do so by
resolution."24 With regard to liability which mayor may not fall on
the board or certain of its individual members, the major issue is
described as follows:
Liability when it arises is most likely to stem from financial
or business decisions made by insiders sitting on the
traditional executive or finance committees.' Given this,
questions arise as to whether liability will fall equally on
committee and non-committee directors, proportionally more
on committee directors, or solely on committee directors. 25
In many cases, the nature of the liability and the existence of
any exemptions from liability for non-committee members will
usually be dealt with by statute. Statutory law in Maryland, for
example, provides that "[t]he bylaws of a corporation may authorize
its board of directors to: (1) Appoint from among its members an
executive committee and other committees composed of two or more
directors."26 Such committees may exercise "any of the powers of the
21. H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS
ENTERPRISES, 212. at 425 & nn.10-11 (2d ed. 1970).
22. See discussion in text accompanying notes 9-10 supra. In Tempel v. Dodge, 89
Tex. 68, 32 S.W. 514 (1895), the Supreme Court of Texas held that a bylaw
purporting to give the executive committee "all the powers of the board of
directors" was invalid. For more recent cases covering the scope of executive
committee authority compare Storer v. Florida Sportservice, Inc., 125 So. 2d
906 mist. Ct. App. Fla. 1961) (corporation was bound by contract authorized by
executive committee and made by the president even though bylaws say
contracts must be approved by the board, if the bylaws also say the executive
committee shall conduct the corporation's business), with Doyle v. Chladek, 240
Or. 598, 401 P.2d 18 (1965) (executive committee may not revise stock
subscription agreement if the bylaws limit its authority to administrative and
ministerial acts).
23. McMullen, Committees of the Board of Directors. 29 Bus. LAW. 755, 758 (1974>.
24. [d. at 760.
25. [d. at 756.
26. MD. CORP. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. 2-411<a) (Supp. 1979),

*

*
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board of directors," except five specifically enumerated activities. 27
An additional provision establishes the "[s]tandard of care required
of directors" which is also to apply to a director in his capacity as a
member of a committee of the board on which he serves. Besides a
good faith standard and the requirement that a director act in a
manner in which he reasonably believes "to be in the best interests
of the corporation," the Maryland statute codifies the "ordinarily
prudent person" standard as it evolved from the common law. 28 Of
particular importance is section 2-405.l(b)(iii), covering reliance on
information from others, which explicitly exculpates a non-member
director when he relies on "[a] committee of the board on which the
director does not serve, as to a matter within its designated
authority, if the director reasonably believes the committee to merit
confidence. "29
The Maryland provisions follow the basic approach of the Model
Business Corporation Act and may be compared with similar
statutory approaches to director liability for board committee acts
adopted in New York and Delaware. Section 712(a) of the New York
Business Corporation Law provides that the board may designate
"from among its members" executive and other committees "if the
certificate of incorporation or the by-laws so provide."30 Committees
are specifically forbidden from engaging in certain activities, and it
would appear that given the amendments made in 1977/1 a
non-committee director will not be deemed under New York law to
have performed an act taken by a committee for which he can be held
liable without proof of direct involvement:
§ 712.

Executive committee and other committees

(c) Each such committee shall serve at the pleasure of
the board. The designation of any such committee, the
delegation thereto of authority, or action by any such
committee pursuant to such authority shall not alone
constitute performance by any member of the board who is
not a member of the committee in question, of his duty to the
corporation under section 717 (Duty of directors).32

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. § 2-41H2HiHv) (Supp. 1979l.
See discussion in text accompanying notes 19-27 supra.
MD. CORP. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 2-405.l<b)(iii) (Supp. 1979l.
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 712(a) (McKinney Supp. 1979-80>The 1977 amendment replaced the words "shall not alone relieve any director"
with "or action by any such committee pursuant to such authority shall not
alone constitute performance by any member of the board who is not a member
of the committee in question."
32. N.Y. BIIH. CORP. LAW § 712(c) (McKinney Supp. 1979-801.
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Additionally, section 717, which deals with the duty of directors, was
completely rewritten in 1977 so as to incorporate the "ordinarily
prudent person" standard and to exculpate a director relying on a
committee in certain specified contexts:
§ 717.

Duty of directors

A director shall perform his duties as a director,
including his duties as a member of any committee of the
board upon which he may serve, in good faith and with that
degree of care which an ordinarily prudent person in a like
position would use under similar circumstances. In performing his duties, a director shall be entitled to rely on
information, opinions, reports or statements including financial statements and other financial data, in each case
prepared or presented by:
(3) a committee of the board upon which he does not
serve, duly designated in accordance with a provision of the
certificate of incorporation or the by-laws, as to matters
within its designated authority, which committee the director believes to merit confidence, so long as in so relying he
shall be acting in good faith and with such degree of care,
but he shall not be considered to be acting in good faith if he
has knowledge concerning the matter in question that would
cause such reliance to be unwarranted. A person who so
performs his duties shall have no liability by reason of being
or having been a director of the corporation. 33

Section 141(c) of the Delaware Corporation Law similarly
authorizes the board to create committees which, "to the extent
provided in the resolution of the board of directors, or in the bylaws
of the corporation, shall have and may exercise all the powers and
authority of the board of directors" in managing the corporation,
with certain enumerated exceptions. 34 Directors and committee
members are exculpated from liability for good faith reliance on
books of account or reports from corporate officers, independent
certified· public accountants, carefully selected appraisers, or "other
records of the corporation."35 This section, unlike section 2-405.1 of
the Maryland statute, does not specifically deal with director
liability for committee action, but an argument could be made to
include any such action within the concept of "other records of the
corporation."
33. Id. § 717 (McKinney Supp. 1979-80l.
34. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(c) <1975l.
35. [d. § 141(e) (1975).
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Each of these statutory approaches has in common two elements:
express provision for the creation of executive and other
committees either by the board, the charter, or the corporate bylaws,
and (2) an attempt to articulate a standard of liability in terms of an
exemption from liability for good faith reliance, or a non-committee
director's being able to show that he behaved as an ordinarily
prudent person, or that his behavior as a board member, through his
own individual activities, did not involve him in the committee's
"performance."36 As is readily apparent, each of these statutory
codifications of a liability standard requires fleshing out by the
common law. Although the principle that delegation to an executive
committee will not relieve a board, individually or collectively, of the
responsibility imposed by law is well established,37 the relevant
factors helping to establish liability or non-liability may include the
type and size of corporation involved, the scope of activity and
oversight expected from its directors, the overall circumstances at a
given time, and the nature of the particular problems creating the
possible imposition of liability.3s In other words, both inside and
outside directors who are non-committee members may want to
appeal to something like an "ordinarily prudent person" standard in
the event that shareholders or others seek to hold them liable. 39 To
understand how the statutory language has been implemented, it is
necessary to turn to its application at common law.
(1)

36. This analysis should not be construed as implying that these three approaches
are the only forms currently used by states. Each state's statute should be
consulted for any given problem. Professor Folk has made the following
observations:
Virtually all new statutes adopt the Model Act provision which
specifies various director liabilities for improper dividends and other
distributions and which grants certain defenses, among them good faith
reliance on books and records and also on financial statements
represented to be correct by the appropriate officer or certified
independent accountants.
While most statutes follow the Model Act, which permits executive
(or other) committees only if the articles or by-laws so provide, it would
be preferable to authorize such committees directly if, as, and when
desired. Of course, the usual limits on delegation and responsibility of
the full board would remain unaffected, as would any statutory
restraints on the powers which could be delegated.
Folk, Corporation Statutes: 1959-1966, 1966 DUKE L. J. 875, 890, 899-900.
37. Aurell, The Corporate Executive Committee: A Dilemma for the Nonmember
Director, 17 U. FLA. L. REV. 525 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Aurelll.
38. See W. KNEPPER, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS § 506, at
118-120 (3d ed. 1978).
39. Aurell. supra note 37, at 529.
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Common Law Application

The leading common law case on directors' liability for executive
committee actions is Kavanaugh v. Gould. 40 Recognizing that a board
of directors could in fact delegate authority to committees,41 the court
recognized the problem arising from compelling directors to become
responsible for a corporation's detailed management, namely, "it
would be wholly impossible for them to accept such a trust."42 In
explaining non-committee members' liability the court spoke as
follows:
The directors generally not upon the executive committee
are not supposed to have knowledge of the details of the
business management of the corporation which are not
submitted to them. In other words, it is not their custom to
actively search the individual transactions in a bank that
they may learn the responsibility of its debtors, or the
nature or value of the collateral. This they intrust, first, to
the executive officers of the bank, who are carefully chosen
and paid for their services; secondly, to the supervision of the
executive committee of their body, which is chosen with a
special reference to this duty, and to which committee must
be reported weekly all the transactions of the bank.
This custom, however, does not relieve directors generally of all responsibility. If the by-laws require monthly
meetings, they must make diligent effort to be present
thereat. They must give their best efforts to advance the
interest of the corporation, both by advice and counsel and
by active work on behalf of the corporation when such work
may be assigned to them. If at their meetings, or otherwise,
information should come to them of irregularity in the
proceedings of the bank, they are bound to take steps to
correct those irregularities. The law has no place for dummy
directors. They are bound generally to use every effort that a
prudent business man would use in supervising his own
affairs, with the right, however, ordinarily to rely upon the
vigilance of the executive committee to ascertain and report
any irregularity or improvident acts in its management. 43

40. 147 A.D. 281, 131 N.Y.S. 1059 (Sup. Ct. 1911).
41. Id. at 288,131 N.Y.S. at 1064 (citing Cassidy v. Uhlmann, 170 N.Y. 505, 516,
63 N.E. 554, 556 (1902).
42. Id. at 289, 131 N.Y.S. at 1065.
43. Id. at 288-89, 131 N.Y.S. at 1064 (emphasis in original).
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With reference to executive committee members, the court was
specific:
To the members of the executive committee is assigned the
duty of detail supervision. With this duty they are bound to
be on their guard to detect any irregularities or improvident
acts on the part of the executive officers. They are required
to scan critically the detailed reports which are made to
them by such officers. The diligence required of them is
therefore greater and the rule of their liability more strict
than that of a director not a member of that committee, for
to them not only do the stockholders look for protection, but
the directors themselves, and upon their fidelity to their
commission all parties must rely.44
The court concluded with the "necessary inference" that "the
directors not upon the executive committee are not chargeable with
knowledge of detail management which need be reported only to the
executive committee."45 Although Kavanaugh contains an eloquent
explanation of non-committee member liability, an earlier case,
Warner v. Penoyer,46 may be cited for the proposition that directors of
a national bank who were members of the discount and examining
committees could be held liable while other non-committee directors
were exonerated. 47
As already indicated, however, limitations on delegated authority and the extent to which non-committee directors will be insulated
by either their ignorance or inadvertence will depend on rather
fact-specific circumstances. A few cases, nonetheless, indicate that
there exists a minimum requirement as to a director's basic
knowledge of the corporation's activities. Thus, in National Automobile & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Payne,48 the court noted that
"[d]irectors may not abdicate their authority by delegating their
powers of management of the corporation to other persons,"49 and
went on to add that "[a] knowledge of the basic capital structure of
the corporation would appear to be a minimal requirement of the
reasonable exercise of such duties."50 Again, the precise knowledge

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

[d. at 290, 131 N.Y.S. at 1065.
[d. at 293, 131 N.Y.S. at 1068.
91 F. 587 (2d Cir. 1898).
See Annot., 25 A.L.R.3d 941, 1047-52 (1969l.
261 Cal. App. 2d 403, 67 Cal. Rptr. 784 <1968l.
[d. at 412, 67 Cal. Rptr. at 790.
[d. See also Platt Corp. v. Platt, 42 Misc. 2d 640, 249 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1964), rev'd on
other grounds, 17 N.Y.2d 234, 270 N.Y.S.2d 408 <1966>. In Platt, the Supreme
Court of New York County commented that:
It is the obvious duty of directors to know what is transpiring in the
business affairs of their corporation. They cannot assume the responsi-
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required will depend upon the circumstances, as is illustrated by the
SEC's recent decision in In re National Telephone CO.,5l finding that
the outside directors had a duty to be aware of the need for
"corrective disclosure" when the press releases prepared by management were inaccurate:
In general, outside directors should be expected to maintain
a general familiarity with their company's communications
with the public.
Moreover, as here, when important events central to the
survival of the company are involved, directors have a
responsibility affirmatively to keep themselves informed of
developments within the company and to seek out the nature
of corporate disclosures to determine if adequate disclosures
are being made. 52
As both Payne and the National Telephone release indicate, the
"ordinarily prudent person" standard will depend on factors peculiar
to a corporation's present difficulties which threaten imposition of
liability. Directors, then, will be
[c]harged with knowledge [they] actually possessed or which
[they] might have possessed had [they] diligently pursued
[their] duties . . . . In other words, their duty is to be
measured by what prudent men would do in similar
circumstances being in possession not only of the knowledge
and the information they possessed or could have possessed
by diligent attention to all their duties not only as directors
and officers, but also as members of the Executive Committee. 53
An almost inescapable inference from the above series of cases is
that a director's liability will be greater in proportion to his
responsibility concerning matters within the purview of the committee on which he serves. As one commentator has noted, this inference
may be drawn from language in Escott v. BarChris Construction
bilities of their fiduciary' position, then simply close their eyes to avoid
the consequences by the mere failure to act. While corporate directors
are not liable for errors of judgment, nevertheless, the law holds them
accountable for that which they reasonably should have known or
discovered in the discharge of their duties. . ..
42 Misc. 2d at 643,249 N.Y.S.2d at 6.
51. [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~81,41O (Jan. 16, 1978).
52. [d. at 88,880.
53. Syracuse Television, Inc. v. Channel 9, Syracuse Inc., 51 Misc. 2d 188, 196-97,
273 N.Y.S.2d 16, 27 (966) (citation omitted).
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Corp.54 In BarChris, liability was imposed under section 11 of the
Securities Act of 1933,55 because directors either knew or failed to
exercise "due diligence" in discovering certain undisclosed facts. Yet,
the court undertook a detailed inquiry into the "due diligence"
defenses of some ten individuals, finding that standards of liability
varied in relation to an individual's knowledge, experience, professional background (for example, the lawyer, Birnbaum) as well as
what could be expected of him. With regard to Auslander, a
relatively new outside director, the court found that he failed to
establish his due diligence defense, commenting that "Section 11
imposes liability in the first instance upon a director, no matter how
new he is."56 Grant, a director and signer of the faulty registration
statement, also failed the due diligence test, and the court remarked
that:

As the director most directly concerned with writing the
registration statement and assuring its accuracy, more was
required of him in the way of reasonable investigation than
could be fairly expected of a director who had no connection
with this work. 57
What emerges from a consideration of both state and federal
common law decisions is that a director's liability for improper
delegation of authority may be greater, even under a potentially
exculpating statute in state cases, if he fails to exercise that level of
due care consistent with the judicially evolved criteria which provide
meaning to phrases such as "good faith reliance" or "ordinarily
prudent person." Membership on a committee appears to impose
automatically a higher standard of care. Such an imposition is
consistent with both the view that more responsibility entails more
exposure to liability and the "ordinarily prudent person" standard,
since more knowledge and exposure to corporate affairs through

54. 283 F. Supp. 643, (S.D.N.Y. 1968). Friedman, Committees of the Board and
Corporate Disclosure Policy, in 2 MANAGING CORPORATE DISCLOSURE 553, 568
(1978).
55. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1976).
56. 283 F. Supp. at 688.
57. [d. at 690 (emphasis added). For a more detailed analysis of BarChris, see Parts
I and II of Folk, Civil Liabilities Under the Federal Securities Acts: The
BarChris Case, 55 VA. L. REV. 1, 199 (1969). An assessment of the emerging
federal law standards for director liability is necessarily beyond the scope of
this article. For a concise survey of this law, see Wander, Protecting Directors
Against Securities Liabilities, in PREVENTING DIRECTORS' LIABILITY UNDER THE
SECURITIES LAWS 1976, Practising Law Institute Course Handbook Series No.
222, 145 (1976). There is also a series of common law decisions imposing a
stricter standard of care upon inside as opposed to outside directors. See, e.g.,
Bates v. Dresser, 251 U.S. 524 (1920); Savings Bank v. Caperton, 87 Ky. 306,8
S.W. 885 (1888); Boulicault v. Oriel Glass Co., 283 Mo. 237, 223 S.W. 423 (1920).
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committee membership is generally expected to raise the level of
"prudence" expected. 58 In short, the right to rely is "inherent in the
nature of a director's duty of inquiry," and the "proper inquiry
relates to the degree and nature of the reliance"; however, "the
standard will vary depending upon the position of the director within
the corporation and his own special skills and expertise."59 One
commentator raises two questions which relate directly to these
various standards:
May a director rely on the report of an audit committee
without making independent investigation?
Should the reliance concept be expanded so that the director
may rely upon actions by committees of the board pursuant
to duly delegated authority?60
Although the audit committee will be considered separately,61 it
would seem that in light of the above discussion both of these
questions can be answered by referring to the appropriate state
statutory language and any accompanying common law standards
fleshing out the statutory principles. What the commentator does not
address, however, is the issue raised by BarChris and its progeny of
whether the current reliance on a state statute and common law
approach will be overshadowed by federally mandated standards of
corporate accountability and director responsibility. It is to this area,
literally on the frontier of the current legal debate, to which this
article will now turn.
4.

An Evolving Federal Standard of Directors' Liability?

Although BarChris was the first case to interpret section 11 of
the Securities Act of 193362 and result in the imposition of liability,
its holding cannot be restricted to the confines of federal securities
law. The liability standards articulated in BarChris are one bit of
recent evidence indicating the evolution of a federal due care
standard which would impact upon the current pattern of what
might be called directors' "reliance liability." In 1974, even before
the revelations of corporate slush funds and illegal foreign payments,
it was evident that the SEC favored enlistment of the board of
directors to help prevent corporate wrongdoing: "It expects the board
of directors to PB:Y close attention to the functioning and indepen58. See text accompanying notes 25-53 supra.
59. Ruder, Satisfaction of Directors' Liability by Reliance on Others, in
DIRECTOR'S LIABILITY UNDER THE SECURITIES LAWS 189. 196 (19741.
60. [d. at 200.
61. See text accompanying notes 32-43 supra.
62. 15 U.S.C. 77k (1976).
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dence of the outside auditors through audit committees comprised
entirely of outside directors."63 The calls for establishing independent
boards of directors have been heard with increasing frequency, but as
yet, aside from the audit committee requirement imposed by the
NYSE as a listing prerequisite,64 no corporate structural changes
have been mandated. Nonetheless, many large corporations such as
Coca-Cola, Citicorp, and Allied Chemical have established ethical
guidelines for their officers, directors, and employees. 65 Yet, as
Leonard Silk has recognized:
The corporate reformation will be enduring only if
statements of ethical standards are matched by the building
of institutions and procedures within the corporation to
insure that the standards are enforced. This will involve
strengthening the independence and oversight powers of
boards of directors and their audit committees. It will
involve improving the flow of information to the board and
up and down the organization. It will also require establishing oversight and review committees at different levels. 66
The entire reliance structure, however, could be radically
changed in the event that corporations move in the direction of more
independent boards of directors. Both the Business Roundtable, an
association of 190 chief executive officers which takes positions on
public policy issues, and SEC Chairman Williams have endorsed the
"strong tendency" of large United States corporations to have boards
consisting of a majority of outsiders.s7 Williams, however, stressing
again the "quasi-public" character of the corporation, has called for
an independent board of directors "from which outside counsel and
both investment and commercial bankers would be excluded. In his
view, the only member of management who should sit on a
corporation's board of directors is the chief executive - and that
officer should not act as chairman."66 Although most of these
suggestions are still at the "talking" stage, there is evidence that
individuals such as Stanley Sporkin, Director of the SEC's Enforcement Division, favor a legislated investors' bill of rights which would

63. Caplin, Outside Directors and Their Responsibilities: A Program of Due Care, 1
J. CORP. LAW 57. 71 (1975) (referring to Securities Act Release No. 5550, FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 72,187 <Dec. 20, 1974» [hereinafter cited as Caplin].
64. See text accompanying notes 35-38 supra.
65. Silk, Ethical Guides for Companies, N.Y. Times, June 15, 1978, at D2, col. 1.
66. [d.
67. 437 SEC. REG. & L. REP. <BNA) A-21 (Jan. 25, 1978).
68. [d. at A-22.
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have the net effect of "reopening the federal courts to our shareholders."69 Furthermore, Sporkin claims that the SEC "or another
agency" has the authority to set qualifications for corporate directors
as well as to disqualify those who fail to discharge adequately their
fiduciary responsibility.70
One example of the SEC's increased activism in this area - of
its greater willingness to look over the directors' shoulders - is the
1977 Consent Order filed with respect to the Zale Corporation. In
SEC v. Zale COrp.,'l the SEC used evidence of the company's
half-hearted investigation of certain inside directors as proof of a
securities law violation. Specifically, an independent committee of
outsiders charged with conducting the investigation was adjudged by
the SEC to have failed to "conduct a meaningful independent
investigation."72 Eventually, the board of'directors abolished the
committee leaving the investigation to be conducted by the chairman's son. As Professor Coffee has observed, at present there is very
little "judicial interest in piercing the veil of formalism to achieve a
meaningful definition of board 'independence.' "73 To the extent that
corporations attempt to meet the criticisms voiced by Chairman
Williams with token reform, they "[invite] SEC activism to fill the
void, resulting in an overexpansion of that agency'g jurisdiction that
may well be undesirable."74 What this entails for the entire "reliance
liability" structure is obviously the interjection of federal standards
into areas currently left to state court assessment, such as the degree
of expertise of a director, his experience with and knowledge of the
corporation, and the other more or less "fact specific" elements taken
into consideration by the "good faith" and "prudent person" standards.
Insofar as the executive committee is concerned, the current
debate has focused on the need to staff it with outsiders who are
independent of management. As of the present, the debate has been
just that - a debate. In the area of the audit committee, however, a
long-standing debate has materialized into a concrete rule to be.
imposed by the NYSE on all listed companies.

69. 402 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-I (May 11, 1977>70.Id.
71. SEC v. Zale Corp., SEC Litigation Release No. 8081 (Aug. 24, 1977).
72. Id. at 2.
73. Coffee, supra note 3, at 1236.
74. Id.
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III. THE AUDIT COMMITTEE

A. History
The idea of an audit committee was suggested by the SEC in
1940 in its report on the McKesson & Robbins investigation. 75 Very
little activity, however, occurred with regard to audit committees
until 1967 when the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) recommended appointing a committee of outside
directors to nominate and work with independent auditors.76 In 1972,
the SEC endorsed the creation of corporate audit committees. 77 A
year later the New York Stock Exchange made a similar endorsement.78
In light of the revelations concerning corporate bribery and
illegal payments which surfaced after the Watergate affair, the audit
committee took on even greater importance. Specifically, an audit
committee on financial accounting was seen as a means of providing
a direct channel of communications between the board and the
corporation's auditors:

It lessens the outside auditors' direct reliance on management and helps the outside directors meet their obligations
of due care. Generally, it recommends the auditors to be
selected by the company, reviews reporting policies and
practices, reviews the scope and results of an audit, and
reviews the adequacy of the company's accounting and
financial controls.
Since 1972, the SEC has indicated its broad support for
the creation of an audit committee. Corporations have been
urged to form these committees so as to increase the
independence of the auditors. On December 20, 1974, the
SEC took steps to implement its position by amending the
proxy rules to require inclusion in proxy materials of (a)
information concerning the existence and composition of the
audit committee and (b) if none exists, a statement to that

75. 5 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) IJ 72,020 (Dec. 5, 1940). See Mautz & Neumann, The
Effective Corporate Audit Committee, 48 HARV. Bus. REV. 57, 59 (Nov.-Dec.
1970); Feller & Loo, The Audit Committee, in 2 MANAGING CORPORATE DISCLOSURE
633, 635 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Feller & Loo]; Greene & Falk, The Audit
Committee - A Measured Contribution to Corporate Governance: A Realistic
Appraisal of its Objectives and Functions, 34 Bus. LAW. 1229 (1979); 3 J. CORP.
L. 400 (978).
76. AICPA Executive Committee Statement, 124 J. OF ACCOUNTANCY 10 (Sept. 1967).
77. 5 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) IJ 72,145 (Mar. 23, 1972).
78. Feller & Loo, supra note 75, at 635.
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effect. Among other things the SEC believes that the audit
committee "would lessen the accountants' direct reliance on
management and would put them directly in touch with
outside members of the Board whose performance was less
specifically being reported on in financial statements, thus
increasing the accountants' independence."79
Thus, the audit committee was viewed as a key feature of corporate
structure, having become endowed with a stature second only to the
board of directors itself because of the New York Stock Exchange's
requirement after 1977 that all listed companies establish audit
committees by June 30, 1978. Even before 1977, however, the
required use of audit committees in several SEC consent settlements
became increasingly common. so

B.

The 1977 New York Stock Exchange Rule

Once an audit committee was established, it was a different
matter altogether as to who could or should serve on the committee.
For instance, the extent to which the committee should include
management participation or remain independent of senior management involvement continues to be debated. s1
With respect to companies with common stock listed on the
NYSE, however, this uncertainty was resolved on March 9, 1977,
with the adoption of the NYSE's Audit Committee Policy requiring
establishment of such a committee by June 30, 1978. s2 The Exchange
required that the committee be "comprised solely of directors
independent of management and free from any relationship that, in
the opinion of its Board of Directors, would interfere with the
exercise of independent judgment as a committee member."s:l

79. Caplin, supra note 63, at 77-78 (quoting Securities Act Release No. 5550, FEn.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 72,187, at 62,427 <Dec. 20, 1974»).
80. See, e.g., SEC v. Mattei, Inc. [1974-75 Transfer Binder! FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH), C] 94,504 (Oct. 1, 1974); SEC v. Lum's, Inc. [1973-1974 Transfer Binderl
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH), c· 94,504 (Apr. 11, 1974); SEC v. Coastal States Gas
Corp., SEC Litigation Release No. 6054 (Sept. 12, 1973); SEC v. Zale Corp.,
SEC Litigation Release No. 8081 (August 24, 1977); SEC v. Killearn. SEC
Litigation Civil Action No. TCA-75-67 (May 2. 1977). See also J. BA!'ON & J.
BROWN, CORPORATE DIRECTORSHIP PRACTICES: R()I.~:. SEI.ECTION AND LE(;"!. STATlIS OF
THE BOARn 117-27 (1975); TH~; COOP~;RS & LYBRAND AlIDIT Cmnll'rn:~: GllfDE (2d
ed. 1976>.
81. Compare Lam, Management Representation on Audit Committees. Tm: CPA J.
33 (Nov. 1975) (recommends that if management is to be represented on audit
committee. it should comprise a minority of its members) with Lovdal. Makill~
the Audit Committee Work, 55 HARV. BlIs. REV. 108 (Mar·Apr. 1977) (opposes
management involvement>. See also 3 J. CORI'. L. 400. 420-21 !l978).
82. NYSE GUIIlE (CCH) « 2495H (1978>.
83. [d. at ·1229.
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The SEC was clearly pleased with the Exchange's listing
requirement. In a letter to Exchange President William Batten dated
May 11, 1976, then SEC Chairman Hills had suggested an amendment of the Exchange's listing policies in order to increase the role
and percentage of outside directors on publicly listed companies. 84 In
testimony later that year before a Senate Committee, Hills stated
that he favored a majority of outsiders on the board. 85 Additionally,
on January 19, 1977, the Commission proposed a series of rule
amendments requiring registered and reporting issuers under the
Securities Exchange Act to maintain accurate corporate books and
records as well as an "attendant system of internal accounting
controls."86 As with the current fabric of common law liability,
standards of effective control systems will depend on particular
circumstances:
Systems of control will, of course, vary from company to
company. The size of the business, diversity of operations,
degree of centralization of financial and operating management, amount of contact by top management with day-to-day
operations, and numerous other circumstances are factors
which management must consider in establishing and
maintaining an internal accounting controls system. 87
Director liability would be implicated under new rule 13b-2 which
requires management to devise and maintain a system of internal
auditing controls.
As of June 30, 1978, creation of an audit committee became a
listing requirement for the NYSE. There have been no legal opinions
as to the degree to which creation of such committees entails a
higher standard of director due diligence. Director liability for
reliance on an audit committee's report would seem to be subject to
the prevailing common law and statutory approach discussed earlier
in connedion with executive committees. 88 Under the common law
standards, audit committee members would appear to assume
greater liability than non-audit committee directors. The extent to
which such delegation of authority is required, however, may tend to
complicate the analysis, especially in light of the fairly rigid
requirements as to who can and cannot serve on the audit

84. SENATE BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS COMM., 94TH CONGo 2D S~;HH.,
REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISHION ON QUESTIONABLE AND
ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACTICEH, Exhibit D. (Comm. Print 1976).
85. [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) • 80,611 (June 21, 1976).
86. [d. at ~80,896 (Jan. 19, 1977).
87. [d. at 87,379.
88. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78m(b)(2HB) (1976).
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committee. 89 At the same time, a showing of pro forma compliance
with the NYSE Rule may itself be enough to constitute a director's
"due diligence" in relying on an audit committee. Although no new
89. The New York Stock Exchange Audit Committee Policy provides as follows:
Audit Committee Policy
Each domestic company with common stock listed on the Exchange,
as a condition of listing and continued listing of its securities on the
Exchange, shall establish no later than June 30, 1978 and maintain
thereafter an Audit Committee comprised solely of directors independent of management and free from any relationship that, in the opinion
of its Board of Directors, would interfere with the exercise of
independent judgment as a committee member. Directors who are
affiliates of the company or officers or employees of the company or its
subsidiaries would not be qualified for Audit Committee membership.
A director who was formerly an officer of the company or any of its
subsidiaries may qualify for membership even though he may be
receiving pension or deferred compensation payments from the company
if, in the opinion of the Board of Directors, such person will exercise
independent judgment and will materially assist the function of the
committee. However, a majority of the Audit Committee shall be
directors who were not formerly officers of the company or any of its
subsidiaries.
Supplementary Material
In order to deal with the complex relationships that arise, the
following guidelines are provided to assist Boards of Directors to
observe the spirit of the policy in selecting members of the Audit
Committee.
A director who has, or is a partner, officer or director of an
organization that has customary commercial, industrial, banking or
underwriting relationships with the company which are carried on in
the ordinary course of business on an arms-length basis may qualify for
membership unless, in the opinion of the Board of Directors, such
director is not independent of management or the relationship would
interfere with the exercise of independent judgment as a committee
member.
A director who, in addition to fulfilling the customary director's
role, also provides additional services directly for the Board of Directors
and is separately compensated therefor, would nonetheless qualify for
membership on the Audit Committee. However, a director who, in
addition to his director's role, also acts on a regular basis as an
individual or representative of an organization serving as a professional
advisor, legal counselor consultant to management, would not qualify
if, in the opinion of the Board of Directors, such relationship is material
to the company, the organization represented or the director.
A director who represents or is a close relative of a person who
would not qualify as a member of the Audit Committee in the light of
the policy would likewise not qualify for the committee. However, if the
director is a close relative of an employee who is not an executive officer
or if there are valid countervailing reasons, the Board of Directors'
decision as to eligibility shall govern.
While SEC Rule 405 may be helpful to the Board of Directors in
determining whether a particular director is an "affiliate" or a close
relative for purposes of this policy, it is not intended to be so technically
applied as to go beyond the spirit of this policy.
NYSE GUIDE (CCH) 11 2495H (adopted by the Exchange March 9, 1977).
For a general discussion of the liability of committee members and
noncommittee directors, see 3 J. CORP. L. 400, 416-17 (1978).
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standards of liability have as yet evolved, as with executive
committees, the law may be in flux at the fringes, especially when
one considers the SEC's recent actions in light of corporate
misconduct as a possible model for corporate reform.
C. An Emerging Federal Standard?
If the outside directors on an audit committee were to prove to be
"shams," would the directors as a whole be liable? What if the trend
toward outsider boards were simultaneously undercut by the fact
that many such directors were h~nd-picked by the chief executive
officer?90 In discussing the possible creation of a federal duty of due
care for directors, Professor Coffee refers to the somewhat unusual
SEC v. Shiell complaint brought by the Division of Enforcement in
which "directors (including outside directors) who failed to control
management adequately could be found to violate the federal
securities laws, because implicitly they falsely represented the
material fact that they were in control of the company."91 As further
evidence of a federal due care standard, Coffee points to proposed
(now effective) rule 13b_2,92 and the NYSE audit committee rule. 93 In
the case of sham complIance with the audit committee rule, it is even
possible that a court might imply a private right of action on the
basis that the rule was a substitute for direct federal regulation or
served to support an .. 'evidence of negligence' approach."94 Although
such a duty might be unknown to common law, it could be regarded
as intended to protect the shareholder-plaintiff, and Judge Friendly
has stated that an implied private right of action could be found
when an Exchange rule served as a "substitute" for SEC regulation
and imposed a duty unknown at common law. 95 In the case of the
Shiell complaint, the theory advanced by the SEC would clearly
undercut the reliance on management holding of state cases such as
Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. CO.96
A fc,urth indication of expanded federal standards in the area of
corporate management is the recent legal opinion of the SEC's
general counsel on the Commission's authority to require public
90. Professor Coffee cites a study indicating that in 46.5«< of the companies
surveyed, the chief executive officer was the "initial decision maker regarding a
prospective director." Coffee, supra note 3, at 1233.
91. Coffee, supra note 3, at 1249; SEC v. Shiell, SEC Litigation Release No. 7763
(Jan. 31, 1977>'
92. Although a private litigant would lack standing, the SEC could require
restitution to the corporation as "an ancillary equitable remedy." Coffee. supra
note 3, at 1273.
93. [d.
94. [d. at 1274.
95. Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co .• 358 F.2d 178. 182 (2d Cir.). cert. denied.
385 U.S. 817 (1966>.
96. 41 Del. Ch. 78, 188 A.2d 125 <i9631. Coffee. supra note 3. at 1249.
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companies to establish independent audit committees. 97 In this
opinion, Harvey L. Pitts, the SEC's former General Counsel,
explained the statutory grounds on which the SEC had "ample
authority" to promulgate such a requirement. An indication of the
SEC's readiness to bootstrap its position is Pitt's reference to the
SEC's approval of the NYSE audit committee rule 98 and the
enactment of new section 13(b)(2)(B) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934. 99
Cutting against this heightened SEC activity, however, is a
recent United States Supreme Court decision, Santa Fe Industries,
Inc. v. Green,loo which may serve to limit the ability of lower courts to
imply a private cause of action in circumstances in which" 'the cause
of action [is] one traditionally relegated to state law.' "101 The Court's
limiting language in Santa Fe was expressed as follows:
Absent a clear indication of congressional intent, we are
reluctant to federalize the substantial portion of the law of
corporations that deals with transactions in securities,
particularly where established state policies of corporate
regulation would be overridden. As the Court stated in Cort
v. Ash,"Corporations are creatures of state law, and investors commit their funds to corporate directors on the
, understanding that, except where federal law expressly
requires certain responsibilities of directors with respect to
stockholders, state law will govern the internal affairs of the
corporation."I02
Interestingly enough, the director of the SEC's Enforcement Division, Stanley Sporkin, has already gone on record as opposing Santa
Fe. 103
As noted above, the law in this area is unsettled with regard to
both the likely de facto emergence of a federal standard and the
expectations to be accorded audit committees. While welcoming the
initiatives taken by the stock exchanges, the National Association of
Securities Dealers, and the AICPA in compelling the creation of
audit committees, SEC Chairman Williams noted that:

[1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 81,535 (Mar. 2, 1978l.
[d. at 80,177.
[d. at 80,181.
430 U.S. 462 (1977).
[d. at 478 (quoting Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 40 (1977)
(quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.s. 66, 78 (1975»).
102. 430 U.S. at 479 (emphasis in original), See St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 562 F.2d 1040 (8th Cir. 1977).
103. Wall St. J., May 5, 1977, at 3, col. 2.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
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These efforts are important, but the next question which
must be faced is the definition of the audit committee's
responsibilities. At present, many audit committees are,
undoubtedly, not working effectively, and may serve more to
provide windowdressing than to add substance to the
accountability process. . . . But no consideration of the role
of directors is complete without underscoring the importance
of an effective audit committee. 1M
In terms of substantive liability, the mandated use of audit
committees may directly impact upon the current status of director
liability for delegated authority. At this time, however, one can only
reconstruct the continuing dialogue, as legal certainties have not yet
emerged.
IV.

OTHER IMPORTANT COMMITTEES OF THE BOARD
OF DIRECTORS: NOMINATING AND
COMPENSATION COMMITTEES

A. Nominating Committees
Apparently, the focus by the SEC, at least during the past six
years, on corporate restructuring and management accountability
has been primarily on promoting the appointment of outside
directors in the hope of achieving a more independent board and in
the establishment of audit committees which, in theory, will reduce
the instances of illegal bribes and corporate slush funds. With most
of the attention going to audit committees, the nominating committee has not been as carefully considered; however, as already noted,
at least one SEC commissioner believes the Commission has the
authority to compel the use of nominating committees through its
proxy regulations. In its proposed model board and committee
structure for a public corporation, the Section on Corporation,
Banking and Business Law of the American Bar Association
published a Corporate Director's Guidebook,105 which recommended a
minimum of three working committees, namely the audit, nominating, and compensation committees. The guidebook recommends that
the audit and compensation committees be staffed with non-

104. Speech by SEC Chairman Harold M. Williams, "The Role of the Director in
Corporate Accountability," to the Economic Club of Detroit, Detroit, Michigan
(May 1, 1978).
105. A Corporate Director's Guidebook, 32 Bus. LAW. 5 (1976). See also The Overview
Committees of the Board of Directors, 34 Bus. LAW. 1837 (1979), for a discussion
of the roles played by nominating, compensation, and audit committees.
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management directors, a majority of whom should be unaffiliated,
while the nominating committee be made up entirely of unaffiliated
non-management directors. lOG Thus far, the ancillary measures
required by the SEC (creation of independent compliance and
executive committees) have not included creation of nominating
committees; however, as a logical outgrowth of the SEC's general
corporate accountability concerns, the best way to ensure an
independent board and effective executive or audit committees is to
have candidates independently chosen. 107
Former Commissioner Karmel focused directly on the role of the
nominating committee as a means by which the SEC can broaden its
approach to corporate management in order to focus more on
"general issues of social significance" and less upon shareholders'
concerns. lOB She argued that the nominating committee is neither a
radical device nor a costly one. It can, however, become "the single
most effective force in improving corporate governance because of its
impact over time on the composition of the board and, accordingly,
the succession of management."109 Yet, despite her enthusiasm for
nominating committees, she remains "unpersuaded that the Commission should require or urge all public companies, or request the
exchange to require their listed issuers to establish nominating

106. Id. at 33-35. A "management" director is one devoting "substantially full time
and attention to the affairs of the corporation, one of its subsidiaries, or any
other corporation controlled by the corporation." An "affiliated nonmanagement director" is one who has "since the beginning of the last fiscal
year of the corporation engaged in, or proposes in the future to engage in,
transactions with the corporation which are material to the corporation or to
the director (or to his affiliated corporation), or if he has close familial ties to a
member of key management." Id. at 31.
107. Former Commissioner Karmel noted that "[n]ormally, board committees
required to be established must maintain an independent majority acceptable
to the Commission." Karmel, Chicago I Speech, supra note 2, at 16. She also
notes that section 10(a) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.s.C.
§ 80a-10 (1976), requiring at least 40% of the board of a registered investment
company to be filled with unaffiliated persons or independent directors, may
prove an indirect influence over corporate structure: "Although in practice the
independence of unaffiliated directors has not always been achieved, the
Commission has substantial authority under the 1940 Act to require a board
model which would insure the statutory standards of independence." Id. at 17.
At present this standard of independence is not fully defined, although Ms.
Karmel notes that the Commission's statements on independence of accountants may influence the concept of independence as it pertains to membership
on corporate boards. Id.
108. Karmel, Chicago II Speech supra note 9, at 9.
109. Id. at 10. In fact, during the two years since Ms. Karmel's speech, "nominating
committees dominated by outside directors have become fixtures on mort
corporate boards." Harris, Survey Finds Board Nominating Panels Help
Determine Management Succession, Wall St. J., Jan. 28, 1980, at 21, col. 4.
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committees."llo Favoring governmental self-restraint, she nonetheless
endorse[s] a requirement that registrants state in their
proxy material or their annual report to shareholders
whether there is a nominating committee on the board and,
if so, who the members are. In the view of the Advisory
Committee on Corporate Disclosure it would be reasonable
to require this type of disclosure because registrants are
required already to identify the members of the Executive
and Audit Committees. lll
Curiously enough, though, this approach is precisely that followed by
the SEC in the case of audit committees, when the Commission
anticipated that corporations would prefer to create such committees
rather than disclose that they did not have them. Although one can
only predict on the basis of the SEC's prior behavior, former
Commissioner Karmel's approach sounds like a warning that despite
her faith in the "innovative capability of the private sector . . .
corporations which ignore the voices clamoring for corporate governance reforms do so at their peril."ll2 SEC Chairman Williams has
already been quoted to the effect that "regardless of the number of
management directors, committees composed exclusively of independent directors for audit, nomination of directors, executive compensation, and conflict of interest are essential. "113 One of the indications of
the possible effect this SEC prodding may have, is a survey by
KornlFerry International, an executive research firm, which shows
that although most of the 1500 NYSE companies have had audit
committees for some time, only nineteen percent of the 501
companies surveyed had nominating committees. Eight years ago,
however, practically none of the companies surveyed had nominating

110. ld. at 11.
111. ld. at 12. Former Commissioner Karmel specifically wanted disclosure relating
to nominee selection procedure and criteria:
Companies would be required to discuss the process by which the
committee selects new nominees for election as directors and determines
whether to renominate sitting directors. They would be required to state
whether the committee solicits or reviews shareholders' recommendations for nominees to fill Board vacancies or for removal of Board
members and to describe the committee's screening criteria and
procedure to enable more informed and appropriate shareholder participation.
ld. at 14.
112. ld. at 15.
113. Speech by SEC Chairman Harold M. Williams, "The Role of the Director in
Corporate Accountability," to the Economic Club of Detroit, Detroit, Michigan,
May 1, 1978.
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committees.1I4 The same survey also noted a decline in the percentage of commercial and investment bankers as well as attorneys
sitting as "outside" directors. Nonetheless, some eighty percent of the
boards surveyed were headed by a chairman who also served as chief
executive officer. liS
The overall climate relating to mandated SEC disclosure has
been one of continued escalation. The possibility that the SEC will
amend its proxy rules so as to make it easier for shareholders to
support their own nominees for election to corporate boards is
already being discussed.1I6 Within the past few years, the SEC has
told its staff to begin drafting rules which will require disclosure of:
-the existence, composition and function of committees of
directors that nominate other directors and executives, set
pay, oversee the company's financial records or perform
similar functions.
-the existence of personal or business relationships between
directors and management. Directors would have to be
classified as management directors, affiliated non management directors, such as the company's outside lawyer, and
unaffiliated nonmanagement directors, that is, someone who
doesn't have anything to do with the company.lIi
Although revisions in the proxy rules to permit greater shareholder
involvement in the nominating process will probably not occur in the
near future, such revisions are likely, and the proposed requirement
to disclose the existence vel non of nominating committees may be
regarded as a step in that direction. As Chairman Williams has
stressed, only voluntary changes in corporate board structures can
retard "the accelerating rush to federal corporate governance
legislation. "118

114. Schorr, Corporate Directors Scored For Lax Scrutiny of Managements' Acts. Wall
St. J., Apr. 10, 1978, at 1, col. 6. More recent statistics, however, demonstrate a
dramatic increase in the number of corporations which have established
overview committees. The Overview Committees of the Board of Directors, 34
Bus. LAW. 1837, 1863 (1979),
115. [d.
116. [d. Schorr writes that: "To foster more audit committees composed of nonmanagement directors, especially at companies not listed on exchanges. the SEC is
pressing accountants not to accept as clients any public corporations that lack
such committees." [d. at 1, col. 6.
117. Wall St. J., June 8, 1978, at 8, col. 2.
118. Wall St. J., Jan. 19, 1978, at 3, col. 1. Just one example of this trend may be
seen in legislation proposed by Senator Metzenbaum which would address
directly the duties and roles of audit and nominating committees. 503 S~:('. RE(;.
L. REP. !BNA) A-2 (May 16, 1979). A description of the proposed changes in
proxy rules which would mandate greater disclosure may be found at 462 SE('.
RE(;. L. REP. !BNA) A-18 (July 19, 1978).
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B. Compensation Committees
In comparison with those committees already discussed, there is
very little literature available on compensation or salary committees. 119 Most of the references to such committees have been in
conjunction with calls for greater use of other board committees, such
as executive, audit, and nominating committees. Thus, Chairman
Williams has been quoted to the effect that, "given a lesser number
of independent directors, then committees composed exclusively of
independent directors for audit, nomination of directors, executive
compensation, public policy, and conflict of interest, become essential."120 Compensation committees will figure prominently in any
effort to increase corporate accountability, because salaries set by an
independent committee would reduce the chance of dominance by
corporate management. The spotlight so far has been primarily on
the audit committee, but the new SEC disclosure rules currently
being drafted will certainly have the effect of increasing the number
of compensation committees being established,121 again because
corporations will prefer to create such committees rather than
disclose their nonexistence.
V.

CONCLUSION

The status of director "reliance liability" is presently in a state
offlux. Although one can rely on the state common law and statutory
approach, there are ever-increasing signs of the arrival of federal
fiduciary standards for corporate management and director liability.
Of the four committees considered in this article only the executive
committee is susceptible of extensive commentary, primarily in light
of the long history of delegation to that committee. As has been
explained, the remaining three committees have been the subject of
increasing attention by the SEC, yet no clear liability rules have
emerged to displace the current common law and statutory approach.

119. For a general treatment of compensation committees, see J. BACON & J. BROWN,
CORPORATE DIRECTORSHIP PRACTICES: ROLE SELECTION, AND L~;(;AL STATUS (W TIlE
BOARD 127-34 (1975).
120. Speech by SEC Chairman Williams, "Corporate Accountability," to the Fifth
Annual Securities Regulation Institute, San Diego, California, Jan. 18, 1978.
121. Wall St. J., June 8, 1978, at 8, col. 2.
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Focusing for a moment on current corporate committee practices,
one cannot help but ask whether all of this concern over committee
creation is only a tempest in a teapot, especially in view of the fact
that most large corporations already have audit committees and
close to twenty percent have nominating committees. One might be
tempted to dismiss the SEC's concerns as an overly dramatic reaction
to the corporate bribery scandals; however, there is sentiment both
within the Congress and the SEC that if voluntary changes are not
forthcoming in corporate board structures, federally mandated
changes will be created and imposed. The issue at the moment is just
how much corporate compliance is enough to satisfy the SEC. The
answer may well depend on whether the SEC can be bought off by
"big" corporations' compliance so that smaller, less visible corporations receive, in effect, shelter from further SEC disclosure requirements. In advising a public corporation in light of the current trends
articulated in this article, an attorney should seriously consider
suggesting the creation of audit, nominating, and compensation
committees in instances in which they do not presently exist.

